2nd TiLPS History of Analytic Philosophy Workshop

Tibor Bárány (BME, Budapest),
The Role of the Principle of Expressibility in Searle's Speech Act Theory

There is considerable tension in John R. Searle's philosophy of language between the so-called Principle of Expressibility ("whatever can be meant can be said") and his views on the role of the so-called Background in the determination of meaning. In my presentation I will argue that Searle's original version of the Principle of Expressibility is only a *methodological* principle, and does not commit us to the view that every literally used sentence determines the illocutionary force of the utterance by their linguistic meaning, nor to the view that the illocutionary force in every case is directly derivable from the sentence's linguistic meaning.

Joan Bertran-San-Millan (ASCR, Prague)
From *Begriffschrift* to *Grundlagen*:
The Adoption of the Distinction between Concept and Object

In this paper I discuss Frege's philosophical transit from *Begriffschrift* to *Grundlagen*. I put the focus on the replacement of the distinction between function and argument with the distinction between concept and object. I clarify the causes for this move and explain what characterises the concept-object scheme. I also claim that two features show the virtues of the distinction between concept and object in Frege's philosophical framework: First, Frege's notion of concept sets a foundation for the principle of the priority of judgements over concepts; second, the concept-object scheme allows an adequate semantical analysis of categorical statements.

Giorgio Castiglione (Turin)
Tolerance *versus* Dogma: For a Revision of the Carnap-Quine debate on Analyticity

The Carnap-Quine debate dealt a blow to logical empiricism, dictating a new agenda for philosophy. I propose an overview of the Quinean objections to the notion of analyticity, and claim that, in denouncing its vagueness, arbitrariness, epistemological and explanatory emptiness, Quine hinges on an erroneous interpretation of Carnapian positions. Showing Carnap's explication at work, I outline some crucial methodological differences with Quine: divergent understandings of *empiricism* trace back to distinct conceptions of the tasks of philosophy. Finally, I present some arguments in favour of the Carnapian meta-philosophical paradigm, in which assuming an analytic/synthetic divide acts as a presupposition for tolerance.

Sam Cowling (Denison)

Goodman, Lewis, and Gnominalism

This paper investigates the history of a heterodox brand of nominalism introduced and endorsed by Nelson Goodman. Goodman's nominalism--"gnominalism," for short--is the denial that there are distinct entities "generated" out of the same basic elements. After setting out Goodman's gnominalism, I consider its reception in the metaphysics of David Lewis. I subsequently compare Goodman's assertion that anti-gnominalism is "incomprehensible" with Lewis' assertion that anti-gnominalism is "unintelligible." I then turn to two arguments for gnominalism and, after suggesting that neither is successful, I take up the question of how gnominalism is best defended via unvarnished appeals to intelligibility.

Ties van Gemert (Tilburg)

Wittgenstein, Tools and Machines in the Age of the Digital Humanities

This paper will discuss the possibilities of some of the tools of the digital humanities for the study of the history of philosophy by examining the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Using one of the leading visualization software for the analysis of extensive amounts of texts called Gephi 0.9.2. a visual network of the most used terms of Wittgenstein will be created. I will conclude by examining to what extent the resulting visual network and other tools of the digital humanities offer possibilities for transforming the current interpretation of Wittgenstein's work and the digital Wittgenstein Nachlass.

Nathan Kirkwood (Glasgow)

Two Milestones of Empiricism: Untangling Quine's Naturalism and Holism

Until recently, the relationship between Quine's holism and naturalism was poorly understood, despite the important influence of these views and their place within Quine's overall philosophy. It's almost universally held that Quine shifted from a radical form of holism to a more moderate one. This has implications for his famous views on logic, mathematics, and analyticity. Verhaegh has recently argued that Quine's view, despite appearances, stayed fixed. I argue that this is right, but that we have to contextualize Quine's radical holism within his naturalistic project of regimentation; this project, including it's use of proxy functions, requires radical holism.

Nikolay Milkov (Paderborn)
Two Concepts of Early Analytic Philosophy

This paper investigates the concept of analytic philosophy first introduced by Frege and Wittgenstein, distinguishing it from the version that originated with Russell and Carnap. By demonstrating how confusion of these two approaches generated a number of misunderstandings in later analytic philosophy, the essay sets the stage for a history of the movement that supplants previous accounts such as those exemplified by the work of Michael Beaney and Scott Soames: the former simply canvasses different concepts of analysis, while the latter ties the evolution of analytic philosophy to the analytic / synthetic distinction.

Gilad Nir (Leipzig)
The Tractarian Account of Inference

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* advances the view that the justification of inference does not require, apart from the understanding of the premises and conclusion, any further act. This account is grounded in Wittgenstein's holistic conception of understanding, where propositions form a network of "internal relations" which structure our capacity to make use of them. Wittgenstein overcomes two challenges that occupy contemporary debates over the nature of inference: Carroll's worry that the evaluative element of inference lacks causal efficacy (giving rise to regress), and the worry that the causal element of inference lacks evaluative content (rendering inference indistinguishable from mere associations of thought).

Lydia Patton (Virginia Tech)
Pragmatism and the Analytic

Quine's "attack" on the analytic-synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is not sui generis. Quine's philosophical training took place in the tradition of Harvard pragmatism, in the wake of the encounters between William James and Josiah Royce, and especially the impact of those encounters on the work of their student, C. I. Lewis, whose *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* is key context to Quine's essay. "Two Dogmas" is not an outlier, but a work that takes a position within a pragmatist tradition that had been preoccupied since the late nineteenth century with analyticity as an *operational* notion.

Francesco Pesci (UIC, Chicago)
Moore on Bradley's Idealism

In this paper I attempt to show how Moore's early emancipation from Bradley's absolute idealism presupposes a fundamental adherence to certain theses of absolute idealism itself. In particular, I argue that the idea of an immediate epistemic access to concepts and propositions that Moore endorses in his platonic atomism (Hylton) is a reworking of a form of *epistemic realism* already present in Bradley. Epistemic realism is the conjunction of two theses: i) reality is independent of any constructive work of the human mind; ii) reality is immediately (nondiscursively) accessible to knowledge; I suggest that Moore's early idealist phase (1897) should be understood as an attempt at isolating this twofold thesis in Bradley.

Maria van der Schaar (Leiden)
G. F. Stout and the Brentano School

First, I will argue that G.F. Stout can be understood as one of the members of the Brentano School. This thesis relates to the topics: act/content/object distinction; theory of judgement; theory of wholes and parts; and the relation between psychology and philosophy. Then, I will address the question: What impact does this thesis have on the origins of British analytic philosophy?

Wim Vanrie (Ghent)
Why didn't Frege accept the Theory of Types?

I argue that Frege's reasons for rejecting the theory of types, as advanced in his correspondence with Russell and the *Afterword* of the *Grundgesetze*, are inadequate. Frege claims that the theory of types yields failures of the law of excluded middle for classes, but this is based on a neglect of the type distinctions proposed by the theory. I explore another reason why Frege may have rejected Russell's proposal, namely that its segmentation of objects into types is unprincipled and threatens to undermine our capacity to think the crucial logical distinction between what is complete and what is unsaturated.